<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Automation on Azarudeen.com</title><link>http://azarudeen.com/tags/automation/</link><description>Recent content in Automation on Azarudeen.com</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2018 10:00:00 +0530</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="http://azarudeen.com/tags/automation/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>When Automation Fights Back: Split Brains, Lightning Strikes, and SLOs at Scale</title><link>http://azarudeen.com/posts/05-jan-2018-to-mar-2019-when-automation-fights-back/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2018 10:00:00 +0530</pubDate><guid>http://azarudeen.com/posts/05-jan-2018-to-mar-2019-when-automation-fights-back/</guid><description>&lt;h1 id="when-automation-fights-back-jan-2018--mar-2019"&gt;When Automation Fights Back (Jan 2018 – Mar 2019)&lt;/h1&gt;
&lt;p&gt;By 2018 the industry had automated failover, orchestration, and recovery — and
the defining postmortems of this window are about that automation making the
wrong call. The question shifted from &amp;ldquo;why did the component fail?&amp;rdquo; to &amp;ldquo;why did
our self-healing make it worse?&amp;rdquo;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 id="the-incidents-that-defined-the-period"&gt;The incidents that defined the period&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TSB Bank migration, April 2018&lt;/strong&gt; — A big-bang core-banking migration locked
UK customers out of accounts for weeks. The subsequent independent review
became required reading on cutover risk, and regulators started treating
operational resilience as a compliance domain.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;GitHub, October 21, 2018&lt;/strong&gt; — 43 seconds of network partition between US East
and West Coast datacenters; orchestration software promoted a West Coast MySQL
primary while the East Coast primary still held unreplicated writes.
&lt;strong&gt;Split-brain.&lt;/strong&gt; GitHub chose data consistency over uptime, running degraded
for ~24 hours, and published a superb hour-by-hour analysis
(&lt;a href="https://github.blog/2018-10-30-oct21-post-incident-analysis/"&gt;github.blog&lt;/a&gt;).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Microsoft Azure South Central US, September 2018&lt;/strong&gt; — A &lt;strong&gt;lightning strike&lt;/strong&gt;
caused a cooling failure; hardware shut down to protect itself, and the
regional outage revealed how many &amp;ldquo;global&amp;rdquo; Azure services (including Azure AD
and the status portal) had hidden dependencies on one region.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Google Cloud, July 2018&lt;/strong&gt; — A global load-balancing configuration event
briefly broke customers worldwide, feeding a growing theme: global control
planes mean global blast radius.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Facebook, March 13, 2019&lt;/strong&gt; — A ~14-hour outage of Facebook, Instagram, and
WhatsApp attributed to a &lt;strong&gt;server configuration change&lt;/strong&gt; — at the time the
longest outage in the company&amp;rsquo;s history.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Wells Fargo, February 2019&lt;/strong&gt; — A fire-suppression system triggered a
datacenter shutdown, and banking customers lost app and card access. Banks
officially had SRE-shaped problems.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;h2 id="what-the-postmortems-reveal"&gt;What the postmortems reveal&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;1. Automated failover needs a theory of data.&lt;/strong&gt; GitHub&amp;rsquo;s incident became &lt;em&gt;the&lt;/em&gt;
case study: failover automation that optimizes for availability can silently
sacrifice consistency. Postmortems started asking &amp;ldquo;what does our orchestrator do
during a partition?&amp;rdquo; — a Jepsen-style question applied to ops tooling.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>