<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Cascading-Failure on Azarudeen.com</title><link>http://azarudeen.com/tags/cascading-failure/</link><description>Recent content in Cascading-Failure on Azarudeen.com</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2015 10:00:00 +0530</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="http://azarudeen.com/tags/cascading-failure/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>The SRE Book Era: Error Budgets Meet Cascading Failure</title><link>http://azarudeen.com/posts/03-jul-2015-to-sep-2016-the-sre-book-era/</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2015 10:00:00 +0530</pubDate><guid>http://azarudeen.com/posts/03-jul-2015-to-sep-2016-the-sre-book-era/</guid><description>&lt;h1 id="the-sre-book-era-jul-2015--sep-2016"&gt;The SRE Book Era (Jul 2015 – Sep 2016)&lt;/h1&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Google published &lt;em&gt;Site Reliability Engineering&lt;/em&gt; in April 2016 and handed the
industry a shared vocabulary: SLOs, error budgets, toil, and a whole chapter on
postmortem culture. Meanwhile, the period&amp;rsquo;s biggest incidents were masterclasses
in cascading failure — systems that fell over not from the initial fault, but
from their own recovery behavior.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 id="the-incidents-that-defined-the-period"&gt;The incidents that defined the period&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;AWS DynamoDB, September 20, 2015&lt;/strong&gt; — The canonical cascading-failure
postmortem (&lt;a href="https://aws.amazon.com/message/5467D2/"&gt;aws.amazon.com/message/5467D2&lt;/a&gt;).
A network disruption caused storage servers to re-request membership metadata
simultaneously; the metadata service, already near capacity from a new index
feature, couldn&amp;rsquo;t serve the herd; retries made it worse. DynamoDB&amp;rsquo;s outage
cascaded into EC2, SQS, and CloudWatch in us-east-1. Action items — capacity
headroom, longer timeouts, segmented retries — read like a distributed-systems
syllabus.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Salesforce NA14, May 2016&lt;/strong&gt; — A database failure plus a failed failover left
a major instance degraded for nearly a day, with some data unrecoverable.
It pushed &amp;ldquo;your SaaS vendor&amp;rsquo;s DR plan is your DR plan&amp;rdquo; into procurement
conversations.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Southwest Airlines (July 2016) and Delta (August 2016)&lt;/strong&gt; — Back-to-back
airline meltdowns from single-point-of-failure infrastructure (a failed router;
a datacenter power incident) cancelling thousands of flights. Boards started
asking about technical debt.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Telstra, 2016&lt;/strong&gt; — A string of national mobile outages in Australia, one
triggered by a single node being taken offline incorrectly, normalized the
telco postmortem press release.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;h2 id="what-the-postmortems-reveal"&gt;What the postmortems reveal&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;1. Retry storms became a named enemy.&lt;/strong&gt; The DynamoDB writeup made &amp;ldquo;metastable
failure&amp;rdquo; patterns mainstream years before the academic term: exponential backoff,
jitter, circuit breakers, and load shedding moved from Netflix blog posts into
default library behavior (and into everyone&amp;rsquo;s action items).&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>