<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Incident-Response on Azarudeen.com</title><link>http://azarudeen.com/tags/incident-response/</link><description>Recent content in Incident-Response on Azarudeen.com</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2013 10:00:00 +0530</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="http://azarudeen.com/tags/incident-response/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>The Blameless Awakening: How Postmortems Became Engineering Culture</title><link>http://azarudeen.com/posts/01-jan-2013-to-mar-2014-the-blameless-awakening/</link><pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2013 10:00:00 +0530</pubDate><guid>http://azarudeen.com/posts/01-jan-2013-to-mar-2014-the-blameless-awakening/</guid><description>&lt;h1 id="the-blameless-awakening-jan-2013--mar-2014"&gt;The Blameless Awakening (Jan 2013 – Mar 2014)&lt;/h1&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In early 2013, the public postmortem was still a novelty. Most companies treated
outages as PR problems to be minimized, not learning opportunities to be shared.
By the spring of 2014, that had visibly changed — and this 15-month window is
where the modern postmortem culture took root.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 id="the-incidents-that-defined-the-period"&gt;The incidents that defined the period&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Microsoft Azure, February 2013&lt;/strong&gt; — A worldwide Azure Storage outage caused by
an &lt;strong&gt;expired SSL certificate&lt;/strong&gt;. The lesson — certificate lifecycle management is
an operational discipline, not a checkbox — still gets relearned every year.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Google, August 2013&lt;/strong&gt; — Google went dark for roughly 2–5 minutes, and global
internet traffic reportedly dropped ~40%. The first mainstream glimpse of how
concentrated the web had become.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Amazon.com, August 2013&lt;/strong&gt; — A ~30-minute outage of the retail site, widely used
to popularize &amp;ldquo;downtime costs $X per minute&amp;rdquo; math in reliability business cases.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;NASDAQ &amp;ldquo;Flash Freeze,&amp;rdquo; August 2013&lt;/strong&gt; — A three-hour trading halt traced to a
software flaw in the Securities Information Processor, showing that finance&amp;rsquo;s
bespoke infrastructure had the same failure modes as web systems.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;HealthCare.gov, October 2013&lt;/strong&gt; — Not a cloud outage but the era&amp;rsquo;s defining
systems failure: a big-bang launch with no load testing, no incremental rollout,
and no operational ownership. Its rescue by a small team of web-industry
engineers seeded what later became the US Digital Service — and became the
canonical argument for DevOps practices in government and enterprise.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;h2 id="what-the-postmortems-reveal"&gt;What the postmortems reveal&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;1. &amp;ldquo;Blameless&amp;rdquo; went from Etsy blog post to industry norm.&lt;/strong&gt; John Allspaw&amp;rsquo;s
writing on blameless postmortems and Etsy&amp;rsquo;s open-sourced &lt;strong&gt;Morgue&lt;/strong&gt; tool (their
internal postmortem tracker) gave teams both the philosophy and the software.
The core idea — engineers closest to the failure have the most information, and
punishing them destroys that information — started appearing in conference talks
everywhere.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>